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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HUTH NEIGHBORS ADAM·s,

Plaintiff a.nd Appellant,

Case No. 8141

-vs.:B.,LORETTA LANG,
Defendant a.nd Resp·ondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEl\IEN~r

OF FACTS

The plaintiff file·d an action to recover for personal
injuries '''hich she sustained in an automobile accident
on the 15th day of December, 1952, at about 6 :50 A.l\L
on 1~. S. Highway 50 west of l\1agna and about one-fourth
of a 1nile east of the Arthur Mill in Salt Lake County,
(11. 1, ~' ~7). There were four persons, including the
driver, in the car. The defendant was operating the
car. The plaintiff was riding in the right front seat.
Marjorie Jacques was riding in the middle of the front
seat, and Robert Adamson was riding in the back seat,
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(R. 144). The four occupants in the car \\Tere en1ployed
at the Tooele ·Ordnance Depot, (R. 133). The vehicle
'vas owned by Manuel Jacques, 1\Iarjorie's husband. ~r r.
Jacques generally drove the car to and fron1 work,
(R. 74, 75). However, on the morning of the accident
he did not go to work and the defendant 'vas requested
'by Mrs. Jacques to drive the vehicle, (R. 76, 119). Mrs.
Jacques had first asked the plaintiff to drive the car, but
she refused. Mrs. Jacques then drove the car to the defendant's hon1e, (R. 140). There l\Irs. Jacques told the
defendant that she would have to drive. The defendant
did not want to drive, saying she would prefer to take
her own ear, but Mrs. Jacques said that she "·ouldn~t
drive and that the plaintiff refused to drive; that if they
were going to get to work, the defendant 'vould have to
drive; that her car was already warmed up and to take
it. The defendant undertook to drive the car under
these circu..lJlstances and in order that they could get to
vvork, (R. 76, 141, 210). The plaintiff had agreed to pay
I\fr. Jacques $1.00 a day for her transportation to and
from the Depot, (R. 140).
The accident occurred on a curve in the road. Photos
we,re introduced showing the high,vay at the scene of the
accident, (Exhibits 15, 16 and 17 (D) ). However, the
guard ra.i'ls shown in the photos on the outside of the
curve were not erected or in place at the time of the accident, (R. 83, 84, 111). A plat vvas also introduced in evidence showing the highway and curve at the scene of the
.accident, (Exhibit 28 (D) )~ It 'vas undisputed that the
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posted speed at the scene of the accident was 40 n1iles per
hour and the sign so designating the speed limit is shown
right at the curve in the photos and also on the road plat,
(lL 92, Exhibits 15, 16, 17 (D) and 28 (D) ).
It was dark at the time of the accident, ( R. 77). The
lights on the car "\Vere properly burning, (R. 78). The
car 'vas being opera ted at a speed of 35-40 miles per
hour, (R. 79, 145). As it rounded the curve, it struck an
icy spot on the road and started to slide to the left. The
defendant let up on the gas feed and turned the car
haek to the right. She did not at this time apply the brake
for fear that the car 'vould go out of control, (R. 213).
The car proceeded back to the right but continued toward
the e1nbanlnnen t on the outside of the curve. The defendant tried to turn the car back to the left, but it continued on the ice to the right. \Vhen the defendant saw
that the car was not turning from the embankment she
applied the brakes, but the car skidded on the ice to the
right off the road and down the embankment, (R.. 81, 82,
212, 213). From the time the car first started to slide
until the ti1ne it left the road it was on ice, (R. 214).
Counsel in his statement of facts claims that there
'vere icy spots here and there on the road that morning
and that it was also foggy. This is not a correct statement
of the facts as they existed at the scene. There was no
material disagreement between the parties as to the
status of the weather, the condition of the highway or
the speeld of the vehicle at the scene of the accident.
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The plaintiff on cross exa1nination testified that
the road seemed to be dry fro1n the time they left her
home until the point of the accident; that she did not recall encountering any ice until the point of the accident,
( R. 172) ; that they were traveling at a speed of "between
35 and 40 miles per hour," (R. 145, 171). She admitted
that there was nothing unusual or out of the ordinary
including the speed about which the vehicle was being
operated, (R. 173, 17 4). She ad1nitted that the defendant
\vas driving carefully to her \vay of thinking, (R. 17-t ),
and that prior to the time that the car struck the icy
spot where the accident occurred, there had ·been nothing
about the operation that caused her any alarm or concern, (R. 175); that she had not con1plained or protested
at any time about the 1nanneT in which the vehicle was
being driven, (R. 171); that the first she noticed of anything unusual was when the car encountered the icy spot
and started to slide, (R. 177); that it hadn't occurred

to her a.s they were riding along that there might he any
ice on the highway, (R. 180); that the roads were fairly
dry when they left home, (R.. 181); that no one prior to
the tin1e of the accident had 1nade any mention about
the possibility of any ice on the road, (R·. 181). She also
testified on cross-examination that she didn't know
whether there was any material fog at the scene of the
accident, (R. 182), or whether it was li1nited to the area
down by the canal at the

~fagna

Junction, (R·. 182).
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Mrs. Jacques testified for the plaintiff and said that
they encountered fog at the Magna Junction by the canal,
(R. 122). She didn't remember any fog a.t the scene of
the accident to 1naterially interfere with visibility, (R.
131). There was not enough fog at the scene to cause
her any alarm or concern, (R. 132). She did not notice
any sno\v or ice on the road surface, (R. 122, 123) ; she
had not felt the car sliding prior to reaching the curve
\vhere the accident occurred, (R. 123); she had not noticed any icy patches, ( R. 128), and the road prior to
reaching the scene of the accident was generally dry
that morning, (R. 135). She testified that as they went
around the curve there was "pro ba bly a. place where the
sun never shined, \Vas a patch of ice there, and we started
to skid," ( R. 124). On cross-examination she testified
that they hadn't encountered any ice on the road, nor was
shP conscious of any ice or snow being on the road until
1

the car started to slide at the point where the accident
occurred. She

\\~as

just as startled as the others when

the car started to slide and had not expected it, ( R. 133).
\\i.. ith reference to the speed, she testified that they \vere
traveling at a speed of "around 40 miles an hour," which
\vas their custon1ary speed, (R. 123, 133). There was
nothing about the speed at which the car was being operated that caused her any concern, (R. 132).
The plaintiff called the defendant as a hostile witness. The defendant testified that there was slight fog
at the Magna Junction, (R·. 78); that they were travel-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
ing at a speed of "between 35-40" or "not to exceed 40,"
(R. 79, 80, 180). She -also testified that there was no sno\v
or ice on the road except at the point where the accident
occurred, (R. 79, 82).
As a witness in her own behalf, the defendant testified that the only fog of any consequence was encountered at the Magna Junction. There \va.sn't any fog at the
point of the accident. She was traveling at a speed of
35-40 miles per hour and did not see or encounter any ice
or feel the car slip until they came around the curve
where the accident occurred, (R.. 211, 21~). No one colnplained or protested as to the manner in \vhich she \vas
operating the vehicle, (R. 214). She had driven over the
sarne road the day prior to the accident going to and
fro1n \vork and had encountered no snow or ice on the
road, (R. 221, 222). She drove over the road on that day
at the sa1ne rate of speed as she was driving on the morning of the accident, and to her knowledge t;here was
nothing different in the conditions on the 1norning of the
accident than there was on the previous 1norning. It had
not stormed or rained in the interim, (R. 222).
Robert Adamson, the sole other passenger in the
vehicle, was called as a witness on behalf of the defendant. He testified that there \Vas no sno\v or ice on the
paved portion of the road. They did not encounter any
snow or ice until they rounded the curve \vhere the accident occurred, (R. 187). He did not notice any slipping
or sliding of the car before it reached the point where
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the accident occurred. There was no fog at the scene of
the accident. He didn't notice any fog after the accident.
He testified on direct examination that the defendant was
traveling at a speed of 30-35 miles per hour "in that
neighborhood" at the time she struck the icy spot, (R.
188). On cross exainination he adinitted that he may
have told plaintiff's counsel that the vehicle was traveling at a speed of 35-40 rniles per hour, stating: "It is
pretty hard to tell when you are riding in the back seat
of the car," and that it may have been 35-40 miles per
hour, (R. 194).
Charles Paris, a Deputy Sheriff from ·salt Lake
County, was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff
and testified that he investigated the accident, (R. 87).
He adinitted that after making his investigation and
observing the condition of the highvvay, he Inade no arrests and found no irnproper driving on the part of the
defendant, (R. 106, 107, 108, 114).
The case was subn1itted to the jury on the issues of
the negligence of the defendant and the con tributary
negligence of the plaintiff, and the jury returned its verdict in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
It is from this judgment that the plaintiff takes her appeal.
The resume of the evidence which we have given
indicates there was little dispute between the parties as to
the condition of the weather, the condition of the high-
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way, or the speed at .which the vehicle was being operated. The facts simply showed, or at least the jury
could so find, that the defendant was driving on a dry
road at a speed of 35-40 1niles per hour \vhen she suddenly
and unexpectedly encountered a patch of ice in the road
on rounding a curve; that the car started to skid; that
she acted reasonably to avoid the accident but without
success. The skidding and accident came as a surprise
to everyone.
The appellant 1n her brief has a8~igned only one
error, nan1ely, that the court improperly excluded certain testimony of an expert witness as to the speed of
the defendant's vehicle based upon a hypothetical question. Accordingly, the only question involved on this
appeal is ·w·hether the court erred in excluding this testiInony and our argument \Yill be directed to this point.

STATEMENT ·OF POINT
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF AN EXPERT WITNESS AS TO THE SPEED OF
THE VEHI·CLE BASED ON A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION.
(A) THE TESTIMONY ON SPEED WAS NOT PROPER
REBUTTAL.
(B) THE HYPOTHETICAL QU~STION- WAS NOT
.PROPERLY FRAMED AND
.INCLUDED ELEMENTS. WHICH
.
WERE EITHER NOT IN THE EVIDENCE OR HAD BEEN
TO~D TO THE EXPERT OUT OF COURT ..

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
(C) THE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY MADE NO OFFER
OF WHAT HE EXPECTED TO PROVE BY THE ANSWER
OF THE WITNESS TO THE QUESTION OF SPEED AND
WITHOUT SUCH OFFER, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR CLAIMING ANY PREJUDICE IN EX·CLUDING THE T·ESTIMONY
OF THE WITNESS.
ARGU~IENT

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF AN EXPERT WITNESS AS TO THE SPEED OF
THE VEHICLE BASED ON A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION.
(A) THE TESTIMONY ON SPEED WAS NOT PROPER
REBUTTAL.

Speed \\·as one of the issues of negligence relied on by
the plaintiff in support of her contention that the accident \vas caused by the defendant's negligence. The
plaintiff, therefore, had the burden of proving as a part
of her n1ain ca~e the speed at "\vhich she claiined the
vehicle \Vas being operated and showing that such speed
\Vas negligent under the circun1stances. The plaintiff
testified that the vehicle \vas going 35-40 1niles per hour.
1\Irs. Jacques, a passenger in the car, and one of plaintiff's \\·itnesses, testified that the vehicle was traveling
around 40 n1iles per hour. The only other evidence on
speed introduced by the plaintiff as a part of her main
case was the testi1nony of the defendant which was
brought out \vhen the plaintiff's attorney questioned the
defendant as a hostile witness. The defendant testified
that her speed was between 35 and 40 miles per hour.
The plaintiff, therefore, based her case on speed on the
ground that the vehicle was being operated at a speed
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of not to exceed 40 miles per hour. The defendant in her
case did not refute this clailn, and, as a matter of fart,
the defendant admitted that she was traveling at a speed
of 35-40 miles per hour not to exceed 40 miles per hour.
R.obert Adamson was the only other witness testifying
in the defendant's case as to speed. lie testified that the
vehicle \vas going 30-35 miles per hour, but adn1itted
that it 1nay have been going 40 1niles per hour. At any
rate, the defendant personally admitted that the vehicle
vvas traveling at a speed of 35-40 miles per hour and that
is the 1naterial thing. This was the status of the evidence
on speed when both parties rested their cases. It is
therefore subn1itted that there was no 1naterial conflict
between the parties on the question of speed. The defendant in her case had not introduced any new or affirinative material on the question of speed. There was
nothing for the plaintiff to rebut on the question of speed.
Nonetheless, the plaintiff in rebuttal called S. S. Taylor,
an expert \Vitness, and atten1pted to ask certain hypothetical questions to obtain from him an opinion as to
the speed at \vhich the vehicle was being operated. This
"\Vas not and could not be rebuttal under the evidence as
presented by both parties. If the expert was going to
testify that the vehicle was being operated at a speed
of 40 Iniles per hour, it was n1erely cumulative and would
add nothing because all four occupants in the vehicle had
already testified that the vehicle 'vas being operated at a
speed of 35-40 n1iles per hour. If, on the other hand, the
expert \vas going to testify that the vehicle was being
operated at son1e higher rate of speed than 40 1niles per
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hour, then it certainly was not proper rebuttal testimony.
\Vith the parties being in agreement as to the speed at
vvhich the vehicle was being operated, there was nothing
left for plaintiff to rebut at that stage. Furthermore,
if the testi1nony were admitted for this purpose, it would
be an atte1npt not only to refute the defendant and her
vvitness, Adamson, but also to impeach and refute the
testin1ony of the plaintiff and her witness, Mrs. J:a:eques.
Certainly, after all of the evidence is in, the plaintiff
in rebuttal cannot be permitted to introduce new evidence based upon the testimony of an expert in ansvver
to a hypothetical question, the sole purpose of which is
to show that not only the defendant but the plaintiff
and her \Vi tnesses \Vere in error and that the speed was
greater than that testified to hy any of the parties. It
\vas the plaintiff's burden to show excessive speed, and
having based her claiin on a speed of 35-40 miles per
hour, she could not in rebuttal atten1pt to sho\v a higher
speed and refute her O\Vn testimony.
See Sa ;uu.el Smith, et al. /c. J. M. Richardson et al.,

2 c·tah 424, \vherein the Utah Supre1ne Court in speaking of rebuttal testi1nony said:
"Rebutting evidence is such as explains or
repels, rebuts or counteracts evidence that co1nes
out on the defense. It may incidentally support
the case made in the complaint, but tha.t is not
rebutting testimony which mainly supports the
ca.se stated in the complain.t and only incid1entally
goes to explain or repel the evidence in behalf of
the defense." (Italics ours)
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See also 4 Nichols Applied Evidence, page 3926, Sec.

5:
"Evidence which mainly supports the case
stated in the complaint and only incidentally goes
to explain or repel the evidence in behalf of the
defense is not rebuttal."
See also 4 Nichols Applied Evidence, page 3927,
Sec. 9:
"It is within the discretion of the court to
permit in rebuttal evidence \vhich should or might
have been offered in chief, and statutes so expressly provide in many states. Admission in rebuttal of testimony constituting proof in chief is
not reversrble error, at least unless in case of
abuse or discretion and prejudice. Bttt.t a party
will not be allowed to offer evi,dence iJn rebu,ttal,
which should properly ha.ve been offered. in chief,
except by leave of court. Evidence, pa.rt of defenda.nt' s case in chief, a,ttempte:d to be introdu,ced
after they had rested and plaintiffs had' imtroduced their evidevnce in. rebuttal, was properly
excluded." (Italics ours)

See also 53 Am. J ur., page 106, Sec. 120:
"After the parties have introduced their evidence in chief they are as a general rule confined
to rebuttal evidence, that is, evidence which answers or disputes that given by the opposite party,
-evidence in denial of some affirmative case or
fact which the adverse party has attempted to
prove,-except as the trial court may in its discretion permit a party to introduce evidence which
could have been given as part of the testimony in
chief. One cannot, except in the discretion of the
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trial court, ilntroduce as a pa.rt of his rebuttal
testimony rela.tive to new ()Jnd ilndependent facts
competent as a part of his testimony in chief.
What is rebuttal evidence rests largely within the
discretion of the trial court. * * *" (Italics ours)
See also 53 Am. Jur., page 107, Sec. 121:

"As a general rule, the party upon who-rn the
affirmative of an issue devolves is bou-nd to gime
all his evidence im support of the issue in the first
irnstance, and will not be P'ermitted to hold back
pa,rt of his evi.dence confirmatory of his ca.se and
then offer it on rebuttal. Rebu.ttal testi.mony offered by the pla.intiff should rebut the testimon(jj
brought out by the defendant and should consist
of nothing which could have been offered in chief.
And unless the court in its discretion dispenses
w·ith the requirement, the d.efend'a;nt, as well as the
plaintiff, should introduce all his evid.ence im
chief in support of his main ca.se. But the trial
court may, in its discretion, permit the introduction of such evidence on rebuttal, and an appellate
court will not interfere except in cases of clear
wbuse of discretion. Nor, as a general rule, will
the discretion of the trial court in refusing to
permit evidence in chief to be introduced in rebuttal be interfered with, and in some jurisdictions the appella.te courts will not review this
discretion. * * * " (Italics ours)
It is clear from all of the authorities cited that the
testimony which the plaintiff sought to develop froin the
expert witness in rebuttal was not proper rebuttal. If it
had any place at all in the case, it should have been introduced as a part of the plaintiff's main case. Further-
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more, the effect of the testin1ony sought to be introduced
was to tell the jury that the defendant was wTong, that
the plaintiff was wrong, that the two passengers in the
vehicle "\vere wrong, and to urge them to dis believe the
driver and occupants in the vehicle including the plaintiff
and to find some other or different speed based upon
the testimony of a person "\Yho wasn't even thrre and who,
it would be argued, knew more about the case than either
the plaintiff or the defendant or the other two passengers
in the vehicle. The evidence was not proper rebuttal.
The plaintiff in rebuttal should not be permitted to iinpeach her own witnesses under the guise of rebutting
testimony offered by the defendant.
(B) THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WAS NOT
PROPERLY FRAMED AND INCLUDED ELEMENTS WHICH
WERE EITHER NOT IN THE EVIDENCE OR HAD BEEN
TOLD TO THE EXPERT OUT OF COURT.

In rebuttal the plaintiff called S. S. Taylor and had
hiin identify a 1nap which he had drawn "\Yhieh was marked as Exhibit 24 (P), (R. 239). This map, an1ong other
things, contained a dotted red line purporting to show
the arc or route of the vehicle fro1n the ti1ne it struck
the ice until it left the high,Yay and overturned. 1\{r.
Taylor admitted that he kne"\v nothing about the mark
shown on the dotted red line and that the path \Yas
pointed out to hin1 by someone else; that the course \Yith
respect to the dotted line "\Vas not based upon his o'vn
kno,vledge, but on 'vliat so1neone else had sho,vn hin1.
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The 1nap ''Ta::-; adrnitted in evidence except for the dotted
line \vhich \Yas excluded, (R. 240, 241). The first hypothetical question which counsel fran1ed was as follows:

"Q. Assu1ning that vve had a standard 1941 Pontiac sedan coupe with three ladies in the front
seat and one 1nan in the back seat, with the
accelerator off, that left the paved concrete
portion of the Magna-Garfield highway on
the south side, just west of the culvert, as
indicated on the plats and on the photographs
that I have sh.au'n yoHniR.

~TRONG:

I will object to that; there are
no things illustrated on the plat or on the
photograph as to vvhere the car left the road.

::JIR. :J[QSf-5: I subn1it, your Honor, it has been
testified to by witnesses;

Q. ..A.nd I a1n showing you photographs 11, 12,
and 13 (P), \Vhich have been admitted in
evidence ; do you recognize tlie area in the
photograph~ I have asked you that before~
A.

Yes.

Q. \Vere you present when they were
A.

taken~

Yes.

l\IR. STRONG: Going to rnake further objection
to all this testirnony, your Honor, on the
ground that it is testi1nony that should have
been given on his first case. It isn't proper
rebuttal testimony, and I object to any further testirnony. It is just an attempt to reopen the whole thing, and should have been
testi1nony given in the rnain case. (R. 2-t-~)
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MR.. M·OSS: I submit, your Honor, this is the
proper place for admitting it. Mr. Strong
has come forward with testimony now of his
witnesses that- the car was travelling at a
slower rate of speed-that is, thirty to thirtyfive-and one witness, thirty-five to forty.
(Argument.)
THE COUR·T : Well, there is nothing now before
the court. Counsel started to ask a hypothetical question, then he injected some photographs and stuff, which, as the record stands,
would have to be included within the hypothetical question.
MR. STRONG: Go ahead and ask the question.
THE COURT: If you want to ask the hyl>Othetical question, Mr. Moss, you better start
it over now.
MR. MOSS: Well, we will start over again.

Q. Mr. Taylor, I ask you a hypothetical question: Assuming that a standard 1941 Pontiac
coupe, with three ladies in the front seat and
one man in the back seat, with the accelerator
off, left the paved concrete portion of the
Magna-Garfield highway on the south side,
just west of the culvert, as is indicated on
Exhibits 11, 12 and 13 ( P), which are admitted in evidence and as shown on Exhibit
24 (P) and Exhibit 28 (P), both of which
show the culvert area; and, assuming that
that car, leaving tlie highway at that point,
descr~bed an arc on the sho·ulder or embankment of the road shown on sketch 24 (P)
over frozen ground and frozen snow, without apparent side slippage diagonally across
the dirt and paved portionSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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THE COURT: Mr. Moss, in the interest of time,
that involves some matters that are not in
evidence, and therefore the question, as it is
formed up to this time, would be objectionable.
l\IR. MOSS: \Vhat part, your Honor, do you think
TI-IE COUR.T : The arc you refer to on the last
exhibit. (R. 244)
~IR.

N[OSS: Well, that-Officer Paris has testified to that arc, your Honor.

~rl-IE COl~RT:

Officer Paris, as far as it appears,
hasn't even seen that Ina p.
~lOSS:

}.{R.

Yes, but he has testified to it as
~r r. Taylor testified he took it-.

TTII~~

( iOl~RT: Yes, but, 1tfr. 1foss, this man can't
lllake a drawing from what somebody else told
him they testified to and then use it as part
of the evidence.

~[R.

l\l'OSS: I \vill relate it to the dra\\ring, your
Honor;

Q. -described an arc as is shown on the chalk~IR.

~[R .

STRONG: Starting another.JiOSS: No, this is continuing the same question, back to the arc part.

niR. STRONG: I am going to object; I mean, he
has got to reframe the question because he
has got something in there now that I did not
stipulate to-the arc he referred to on that
exhibit. It is improper unless it is taken out.
So, at this stage, the question has got to be
refrained.
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MR. MOSS: We will ignore the last plat. \Ye \vill
use the chalk drawing.
MR. S·TR.ONG: You have got it in your question.

MR. MOSS: Well, I will ask that part be stricken.
MR. STRONG: No, I want you to start so I will
lrnow what the question is.
MR. MOSS: I thought you were interested in
time.

'THE COURT: You better start over on your
question. (R .. 245)
Q.

Mr. Taylor, let's assume the following factsnot relate:d to any drawing on the board, just
assume the following facts: That a 1941
standard Pontiac sedan coupe with three
women in the front seat and one man in the
back seat, travelling westward on Higlnvay
50, at a point that is-approximately a point
a quarter of a mile east of Arthur ~lill and
proceeding upgrade on that road of approximately four per cent; assume that that car,
with the accelerator off, left the paved portion of the cement highway, and travelled to
the left of the highway up onto a bank-a 25
per cent gravelled bank-that had some snovv
on it, and described an arc across that bank
that was 90 feet in length fron1 the point
where the car left the high.way to the point
where it returned to the highway, and the
highest point of the arc was nine feet frorn
the edge of the concrete to the right wheel or
inside wheel of the car; and, then, assu1ne
that no brakes were applied during that tilne
and there is no indicated side slippage during
that time; assume that that car returned to
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the concrete portion of the highway and proceeded froin the point where it went onto the
concrete portion a distance of 47 feet in a
northwesterly direction across the highway;
and assume that there are no marks on the
highway showing any application of brakes;
and assume the highway is clear at that point
-that is, the surface not covered with ice or
snow; an d assume that car, after travelling
47 feet across the highway and the shoulder,
"~ent off of an e1nbankment at approximately
15 n1iles an hour; and assun1e that that car
landed at the bottom of the cliff on its nose
and did not drag down the face of the shoulder, and, having landed on its nose, turned
over onto the top of the ear onto a railroad
track, \vhich is approximately - a railroad
track \vhich lay twelve feet beyond the face
of the cliff-you get those~ Assuming those
to be facts, can you, by calculation, tell me
the speed at which that car would be travelling in order to traverse that area as described. ( R. 246)
1

~IR.

STRONG: I object to this question on th·e
ground, incompetent, irrelevant, and imInaterial. It is not proper rebuttal testimony.
It is testimony that counsel could have gone
into in the n1ain case. I will object to it on
the further ground that it is not assuming
all of the facts in the evidence, that there is
no coinpetent evidence in the record to assume
it was a four per cent grade. The only testimony on that is based upon a map from the
State Capitol, without any investigation or
1neasurements Inade at the scene, and, further,
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it is based on the assu1nption that no brakes
had been applied, and there is testiu1ony in
the case that brakes had been applied.
MR. MOSS : This is a hypothetical question.
MR. STRONG: I know, but you have got to conform to the evidence.
MR. MOSS: Assu1ne certain facts, and the jury
is permitted to determine whether or not
those facts are in evidence.
THE COURT: ·Objection

"~ill

be sustained."

(Italics ours) (R. 247)
The first atten1pt of the plaintiff to ask the hypothetical question was never finished and the plaintiff's
attorney voluntarily refran1ed it. There is no basis for
complaint at this stage. The second attempt at the hypothetical question referred to an arc or curve as shown
on Exhibit 24 (P). This arc or curve in Exhibit 24 (P)
had been previously excluded since it was ad1nittedly
based upon hearsay evidence. F·urthermore, the hypothetical question at this stage was never finished.
All of the authorities are in agreernent that a hypothetical question cannot be based upon 1natters 'vhich are
not in evidence. See Sta.te t:. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 91
Pac. ( 2d) 457, \V herein this Court said:
"We do not consider it necessary to further
discuss this question, save to advance the adinonition th·a t the court and counsel should be careful
to see that a hypothetical question presents or
assun1es no fact that is not in evidence; that it
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does present all facts or elements necessary to the
deter1uination to be n1ade by the witness, or to
enahle hirn properly to form an expert opinion;
and that no material ele1nent or fact is used by
the witness in his detern1inations that is not presented in the question as asked."
See also 3 Jones Co nun en taries on Evidence, Sec.

1326, page

~± :25

:

~'If there is no testin1ony in the case tending
to prove the facts assu1ned in the hypothetical
question, such question is irnproper. * * *"

The third atten1pt at the hypothetical question,
an1ong other

\Ya~

"·hich there
no

l>asi~

thing~,

referred to a +% grade concerning

no testi1nony in the case and, therefore,

for that portion of the hypothetical question.

'J'lJc enurt l)roverly sustained the ohjection not only

be,·n n~e it

the

\Yas

not proper rPbuttal testin1ony, but because

hypo~hetical

question '"·as not properly fran1ed and

con tainl·d infor1na tion \\·hich \vas not in the record.
Thereafter, the plaintiff had the exvert Taylor testify that lH·
at

1nea~ured

-1-/c, (I\.

~-~7,

the grade at the scene of the accident

:248). lfe then atternpted to add on

to hjs previous hypothetical question as follo,vs:
··Q.

_A_.

Four per cent. .L4nd, haPin.(J lzad those factors
p,oirn.ted out to you and a,n a.rea of the hillside
described by-~ 1rhat JJerson zras that?
Sheriff Paris.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
Q.

Sheriff Paris; did you n1ake a cornputation a~
to the speed that the Pontiac automobile had
to be travelling iJn ord:er to go over the cliff
and land in the position it did, as described
by 0 fficer Paris?

MR. STR.ONG: Just a minute, I will object to
the question on the ground, incompetent, irrelevant, and irnmaterial; it isn't proper rebuttal testimony; furthern1ore, it is based
upon hypothetical questions that were given
on information pointed out by officers at the
scene when Sey1nour Taylor was out there.
It isn't based upon any testimonyTHE COUR·T: The objection is sustained. (I{.
248)
MR. MOSS: Well, I don't know ho'v a hypothetical question can be based on anything
else.
(Argument.)
THE C·OURT: Mr. Ross, the witness can not be
asked a hypothetical questionME. MOSS : The name is "Moss".
THE COURT: -of matters he hears out of court
and which he doesn't-or which isn't in this
record, in the first place; second place, it isn't
rebuttal.
MR. MOSS: He can be a.sked a hypothetical question based on facts which are in evidence,
your Honor.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained."
(Italics ours)
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At this stage the plaintiff's hypothetical question
called the expert's attention to certain things pointed
out to him at the scene of the acci<lent some tin1e later
by Officer Paris and as described by Officer Paris to
the expert witness. These descriptions were not part of
the record. There was no evidence as to what Officer
Paris had ever pointed out to the expert. It was wholly
in1possible to know what condition or things the expert
had in mind as having been pointed out or described to
him by ·Officer Paris. The objection to this hypothetical
question was properly sustained.
See 3 Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Sec. 1335,
page 2-t--!2 :
··The general rule against the consideration
of hearsay by a judicial tribunal finds no exception in the case of expert witnesses. While, as
stated in preceding sections, expert opinions 1nay
in son1e cases be based upon personal knowledge
gained from observation or exa1nination, the
rule is well established that hearsay in the forn1
of information gained from the state1nents of
others outside the courtroo1n is not such personal
kno\\rledge, nor may it be the basis of an expert
opinion. * * *"
See also 3 J'ones Comn1entaries on Evidence, Sec.
1330, page 2433 :

"Opinions
heard or read
staten1ent and
doubtedly open

sought 1nerely upon testin1ony
by the expert, and without relimitation of the facts, are unin the great majority of cases to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

the objection that the witness, ho,vever conscientious, will not found his opinion upon all thP faets
but only upon those which his personal belief in·duces him to assume as true. When he is called
upon to form an opinion upon testimony which
he has heard or read, the witness unconsciously
passes upon the weight of the evidence or credibility of other witnesses, and, in detern1ining the
facts, in effect usurps the province of the jury.

...,

'See also II Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 681:
"The same objections apply to the question,
'On what you have heard of the testimony in. this
case, wh'at is your opinion~'; \Vith the additional
objection that it is here still more difficult to
understand the premises actually in the witness'
mind, since no one else kno,vs exactly ho\v 1nuch
he has heard." (Italics ours)
'The plaintiff's attorney then merely stated:
"Q.

Mr. Taylor, do you have an opinion in this
matter~

1\fR. STRONG: As to \vhat ~
MR. MOSS: Opinion as to speed. (R. 248)
MR. STRONG: Just a minute, I will object to
that on the grounds incompetent, irrelevant,
ana immaterial ; not properTHE COURT·: Sustained, on the ground it is
wholly irrelevant.
MR. MOSS: All right, that will be all; thank
you." (R. 249)
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No further questions 'vere asked. No further witnesses were called. The plaintiff never made any request
to re-open the ease. If the expert had an opinion, it was
\Vholly inunaterial. The four occupants in the ear, including the plaintiff, who sh.ould know n1ore about the speed
than anyone else, had testified without disagreement that
the car 'vas being opera ted at a speed of 35-40 n1iles per
hour-not to exceed 40 n1iles per hour. If the expert was
going to testify to the sa1ne speed, it could add nothing.
If the expert was going to testify to a higher speed, it
was not proper rebuttal.
Counsel at page 3 of appellant's brief states that an
expert 'vitness 1nay be asked a hypothetical question
based partly on his personal observation and partly on
the
to

pre1ni~e

provided by the hypothesis. vVith reference

the experfs personal knowledge, this Court has made

tL(\ follo''Ting comment in the case of Xenaki.s v. Garrett
F're;.r~lzt I~ines, 265 Pac. (2d) 1007, at 1010:

···x:

* \V- e are in accord with the generally
recognized rule that when the 1uaterial facts are
\vithin the expert's own knowledge and are related
hy hi1n in his testi1nony, his opinion 1nay hP based
upon such personal observations and knowledge,
'vithout necessarily having the facts hypothetically stated. lT et it is oln~iotts that the co1crt and
jury must be m.ade aware of the facts upon u·hich
the e.rpr1·t bases his conclusion, ofheru·ise the
tcstinz ony would be of little assistance, wnd there
would be no wa.y of testing the calidity of his
O}Jin.ions. ***"(Italics ours)
•:i:
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We subn1it that there was no error 1n refusing to
permit the exp·ert t~o testify in answer to the hypothetical
question for the reasons aforementioned, and in addition
thereto, because the facts on which the· hypothetical questions were based were in any event found against the
plaintiff by the jury's decision. There was a dispute
as to the course the vehicle took, and particularly whether
the vehicle merely went onto the gravel shoulder to the
left or up onto the bank as conten:ded by plaintiff's
counsel, and whether the highway was covered with
ice during the entire point of the skidding. These points
1nust be deemed as having been decided in the defendant's
favor by the jury's decision. Therefore, at least three 'Of
the material points on which the plaintiff's counsel based
his hypothetical question were found against him. By the
jury's decision the premises for the hypothetical question were not established and there could he no prejudice
in the court refusing to permit the expert to testify. See
II Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 680:

"* * * It f'ollows as a necessary part of the
theory, that if the premises are ultimately rejected by the jury as wntrue, the testimonial conclusion based on them must also be disregarded."
(Italics ours)
The propriety and soundness of the hypothetical
questi on should in any event be left in the sound discretion of the trial judge who is, of course, more familiar
with the situation. S·ee II Wigmore on Evidence, Sec.
682, page 810 :
1
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"' * * * The trial judge should be given discretion to deterrnine how far the counsel can and
rnust properly limit his questions, and how far
the jury Inay be trusted, with the aid of argurnent,
to discover the cnnditional nature of th·e question."
See also Tracelers Insurance Company c. Drake,
89 Fed. (2d) 47:
""The scope of the hypothetical question is left
to the sound discretion of the trial judge. * * *"
See also

Ch~ristia1nsen

v. H olli.ngs, 112 Pae. ( 2d)

723:
••':\: * * l\1oreover, the appellate court is justified in placing con~iderable reliance upon the
deter1nination of the trial judge in passing on the
sufficiency· of the facts narrated in the question.
\\~eaver v. Shell Company, 34 Cal. App. 2d 713,
94 Pac. 2d 364; Graves v. Union Oil Co., 36 Cal.
..:\pp. 766, 173 Pac. 618. * * *"

The record conclusively shows that the hypothetical
que~tions \\-ere not properly fra1ned, included hearsay
evidence, and \Yere based upon facts not in the record,
and the trial court properly excluded the same.
(C) THE PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY MADE NO OFFER
OF \VHAT HE EXPECTED TO PROVE BY THE ANSWER
OF THE WITNESS TO THE QUESTION OF SPEED AND
\VITHOUT SUCH OFFER, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR CLAIMING ANY PREJUDICE IN EX·CLUDING THE TESTIMONY
OF THE WITNESS.

As "\Ve have heretofore indicated, the plaintiff's attorney made no offer of "\vhat he expected to prove by
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the ans"\ver of the witness to the hypothetical question.
It is i1npossible to tell fron1 the record in this case
"\Vhether the expert witness was going to testify to the
speed already given by the other parties, to-"\vit: 35-40
n1iles per hour, or whether he was going to testify to a
higher or a. lower speed.
Rule 43 (C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides as follows:
"In an action tried by jury, if an objection to
a question propounded to a witness is sustained by
the eourt, the exa.minirng a.ttorney may 1nake a
sp·ecific offer of what he expects to prove by the
answer of the witness. T;he court 1nay require the
offer to be made out of the hearing of the jury.
·The court may add such other or further statelnent as clearly sh·ows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. In actions tried
without a jury the same procedure 1na.y be follo\ved, except that the court upon request shall take
and report the. evidence in full, unless it clearly
appears that the evidence is not aillnissible on
any ground or that the "\vitness is privileged."
(Italics ours)
The purpose of the rule is to per1nit an attorney to
make a record on "\vhat he expects to prove in order that
he 1nay USe the Saine as a basis for appeal. t:nder this
rule it 'vas the duty of the plaintiff's attorney, if he desired to pursue the rnatter furtheT or use it as a basis
for appeal, to explain to the court what he expected to
prove by the \vitness and either give the court an opporSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tuni ty to perrni t the evidence to come in, or to further
state the court's basis for its objection to the testin1ony.
liaving failed to do so, it would be rnere speculation for
this court to deter1nine what the plaintiff expected to
prove by the witness, and \Vithout knowing the speed
to \V hich the expert \Vas going to testify, there certainly
could be no basis for claiming prejudicial error in the
court's refusal to per1nit the expert to testify. Therefore
there is nothing in the record on appeal to show that the
plaintiff could have been prejudiced in any event by the
courfs refusal to permit the expert \vitness to testify.

CONCLUSION
We submit that it was not error on the part of the
court to exclude the testimony of the expert \vitness as to
:Speed hecause-(A) The testi1nony on speed \Yas not
proper rebuttal; (B) The hypothetical questions \Vere
never properly frarned and included elements which were
~.·ither not in the evidence or had been told to the expert
out of court, and (C) Because no offer of proof \vas
1nade, th~ record fails to disclose any possible prejudice
on the part of the plaintiff to the exclusion of the testiInony. The exclusion of the testimony was \vithin the
sound discretion of the court, and on the record in this
case the lower court could take no other action. 11 he
judg1nent should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RICH & STRONG,
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent.
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